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Although World War II, especially the battle for Guadalcanal, brought the 
Solomon Islands to international prominence, few of the Islanders emerged 
from the war with significantly enhanced reputations. Of those who did, 
probably only three became well known outside the group. Of these, two, 
Jacob Vouza and Bill Bennett, have been honored as heroes for their service 
on the side of the victorious Allies: Vouza for an act of bravery in refusing to 
tell his Japanese captors about American defense positions and then 
providing useful information to the US Marines; Bennett for sustained 
bravery while serving behind Japanese lines with the coastwatcher and 
guerrilla leader Donald Kennedy.l Other Solomon Islanders who also served 
the Allies faithfully, though less dramatically, were left in obscurity.2 But it is 
in the nature of things for honors to be acquired selectively and sparingly.-
and somewhat fortuitously. George Bogese, the third of the trio, discovered 
that those who do not find favor with the victors are distinctly vulnerable. Not 
all Solomon Islanders, especially in the areas that were longest under 
Japanese occupation, as in parts of Choiseul and Australian-ruled 
Bougainville, were immovably staunch supporters of the Allies. Indeed, some 
of them were subjected to summary punishment for "disloyalty." But only two 
individuals, John McDonald from the Shortland Islands and George Bogese 
from Santa Isabel, were subjected to the indignity of a trial and the ignominy 
of a conviction.3 And of these two it was the fate of Bogese, partly because of 
a close, if hostile, involvement with the well· publicized heroics of Kennedy 
and Bennett, to become the more notorious. 
In Bill Bennett's crisply stated opinion, Bogese was "just a bloody traitor," 
and as such deserved nothing but reprobation and lasting ill repute. Bennett 
had some not unreasonable grounds for his view.4 Unlike Vouza, Bogese had 
chosen not to risk his life by resisting the Japanese after he, too, had been 
captured by them. Moreover he was involved in an incident in which Bennett 
received severe burns from exploding petrol. Besides, in 1946 a court found 
him guilty on a charge of assisting the enemy and sentenced him to four years 
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imprisonment. From a position more detached than Bennett's, however, and 
at a remove of almost half a century, during which Solomon Islanders have 
outgrown their subordination to foreign rule, Bogese's actions seem more 
understandable, and possibly less reprehensible, than they were to his 
contemporary critics. 
Most of the Solomons group had been a British protectorate since the 
1890s, but the government had brought few benefits to the Islanders, as many 
people from Bogese's home island of Isabel complained during the Chair and 
Rule movement of the 1930s, and as others from the southern islands were to 
complain during the Maasina Rule movement of the 1940s.5 Solomon 
Islanders, then, in their own estimation owed the colonial government little. 
As an institution it was remote yet threatening and was represented among 
them only by a few sparsely scattered officials with extensive powers whose 
primary tasks were to collect the annual head tax and to discourage breaches 
of the peace. If the Islanders in 1940 had feelings of gratitude and affection 
for Europeans, they were for missionaries rather than for the government. 
Even so they generally remained very loyal during the war, although this is 
easily explained. Whatever their grievances against their colonial "masters," 
the Islanders did not find in the Japanese an appealing alternative to the 
existing regime ("better the devil you know!"). And the Japanese, given that 
. they were on the defensive during most of their occupation of the Solomons, 
had little chance to make themselves particularly agreeable. Besides, the 
missionaries backed the officials in urging the Islanders to support Britain and 
its Allies. In Bogese's case, however, there were additional and acutely 
personal strains on his loyalty: he was captured at a time when it seemed as if 
the British had abandoned the protectorate to the Japanese, and at a time 
when, although he was in government employment, there was ill-feeling 
between him and his superior, Donald Gilbert Kennedy. Vouza, in contrast, 
was captured after the American forces had arrived to challenge the Japanese 
and was, moreover, encouraged to resist by the memory that years before, as a 
policeman, he had once failed notably in his duty. In being captured he 
accepted a chance to make reparation for that embarrassing lapse.6 Bogese 
had no such spur to heroism. 
Bogese's problems began in May 1942 on the island of Savo. He was 
there, on Kennedy's orders, in his capacity as native medical practitioner 
conducting a medical survey. On 5 May he encountered two Japanese 
survivors from the destroyer Kitsutsuki that had been sunk the day before, 
during the Japanese occupation of the protectorate headquarters at Tulagi. 
They were suffering from wounds and burns. After getting approval from Leif 
Schroeder, a former trader working as an Allied coastwatcher who sent some 
food down from his bush hideaway for the Japanese, Bogese dressed their 
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wounds. Three days later a Catholic missionary, Desmond Scanlon from 
Visale on Guadalcanal, visited Savo and gave food and clothing to the pair. 
He also advised Bogese and others to look after them properly, "otherwise 
there will be a row with the Japanese authorities," and before leaving wrote 
his name and address on a piece of paper, which he gave to the Japanese. For 
his part Bogese--as he later recounted in an affidavit--attempted to conceal 
his occupation and identity from the Japanese, but the deception was soon 
revealed. On 9 May two barges carrying fifty soldiers and guided by a man 
named Tolia arrived at Savo, near Panuel village where Bogese was living, to 
collect their compatriots. When they had landed one of the soldiers addressed 
the watching villagers in English: "The rule of Great Britain is finished. You 
are now under the Japanese military rule. Anybody who disobeys Japanese 
orders must be shot. We now proclaim martial law. All natives must cooperate 
with the Japanese." The party then proceeded tathe village where Tolia 
identified Bogese: "This is Dr George we talk along you before." The 
Japanese who had spoken on the beach then said to Bogese: "My name is 
Sima. I was in Fiji for nine years. I know the names of all the Native Medical 
Practitioners who were trained in Suva. You must be one of them. You must 
tell me the truth, and you must cooperate with the Japanese, or you will be 
shot .... You must come with us to Tulagi. ... All Native Medical 
Practitioners must work for the Japanese government." 
"I was," admitted Bogese, "frightened to disobey," and he proceeded to 
work for a new "master" as an interpreter. On 11 May, Sima (who was 
probably the man more commonly known as Ishimoto) had him write a notice 
in the Nggela language urging the people of that island to return to their 
homes and not to hide in the bush.7 On 12 May, Bogese went with Sima to 
the village ofVoloa on Nggela to recruit men to help unload a ship at Tulagi. 
On 13 May, he and one of those men, Kuini Gee, were directed by Sima to 
translate from English to Nggela another notice "To all the Island People," 
informing them: "The Japanese Army came to protect the Natives. You must 
return to your villages and do your work in peace and remain calm. You must 
give information to the Japanese Military Authorities."8 
On 15 May he had to translate a similar message into the Bugotu 
language of southern Isabel for distribution among his own people: "Will you 
return to your respective villages and perform your ordinary occupations and 
be safe. The Japanese army respect all people in these islands, they didn't 
come to [do] you any harm or to burn your houses and destroy your property, 
they came to protect all your people in these islands.''9 The Bugotu version, 
however, as Bennett later pointed out, contained an instruction not included 
in the English original: "If any natives know of any Europeans hidden around 
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the Islands, who possess rifles, ammunition, etc, they are to report them 
immediately to the Japanese authorities in Tulagi."lO 
Meanwhile Bogese had also been told that he was to go to RabauI, where 
the chief medical officer of the Japanese wished to ask him about tropical 
diseases. Before leaving he was taken with two barge loads of Japanese, about 
fifty soldiers, to Kolare on Isabel to visit his wife and children, whom he had 
not seen since 27 February, when he was sent to Savo.ll 
From that point events took a more dramatic turn, although the truth 
about Bogese's activities becomes more difficult to ascertain. On the 
afternoon of 17 May, with Bogese and his wife and family aboard, the 
Japanese set off in search of Kennedy's vessel, the Wai-a~ which was hidden 
with camouflage not far away at Sigana. According to Bogese he had not told 
the Japanese where the vessel was. Rather he claimed it had already been 
spotted by a Japanese aircraft. Nor, he said, had he told them where Kennedy 
was hiding. According to a Kolare man namedlasper Rutu, however, Bogese 
had asked him where the Wai-ai was hidden; and Rutu, for fear of the 
Japanese, had told him. Rutu also said that Bogese had instructed him to lead 
the Japanese to Kennedy's base at Mahaga, in an attack planned for 4 PM on 
17 May; and had further advised him that a vessel, the Joan, hidden in the 
mangroves by a departed trader, should be found and handed over to the 
Japanese. According to another witness, Joseph Supa, Bogese's wife's cousin, 
who went with them on the barge and who had helped hide the Wai-a~ "from 
the time we left Kolare, Bogese stood with the Japanese on the stern, at the 
place where they steered." Bogese's father-in-law, Maaki Hathavu, 
meanwhile, on his own initiative had sent a message to Kennedy, warning him 
of the intended attack. The unfortunate Bennett, however, received no such 
warning.12 According to him he was on the Wai-ai when he saw the barges 
approaching, "and I saw George Bogese talking to the Japanese and pointing 
to the Wai-ai." Then, to prevent the ship falling into Japanese hands, Bennett 
ordered his crew to pour petrol about, but the Japanese saved him the bother 
of igniting it: "After Bogese pointed out the Wai-a~ somebody on board the 
Barge shouted, but receiving no reply from the Wai-a~ the Barge immediately 
opened fire, the second shot hitting a store of benzine aboard and setting fire 
to the Wai-ai. I dived overboard when the vessel caught fire and managed to 
swim ashore, but was badly burned."l3 
In the light of these testimonies it is clear that Bogese was working closely 
with the Japanese on 17 May. In his defense, however, Bogese denied that he 
had been a willing participant and, while not denying the facts reported by 
prosecution witnesses, offered explanations calculated to minimize his 
responsibility. Thus, regarding the proposed attack on Kennedy'S post, 
Bogese claimed that it was only after the Japanese told him they had already 
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detected it by radio direction finding and threatened to shoot him if he did 
not help them locate it that he told Rutu to lead them to Mahaga. Besides, he 
said, he did not think Kennedy was there at the time. As for the attack on the 
Wai-a~ he said that 
an aircraft had already spotted the vessel. ... The Japs told me that they had 
found a ship. I said I knew nothing of any Ship. The Japs then said I should 
ask somebody to say exactly where the ship was, that the aeroplane had 
spotted one. I asked Rutu. I admit this. I asked Rutu and Rutu said at 
Sigana .... [On the way there] I was sitting on the stem of the ship. Supa 
and Gee were forward. As soon as we arrived at Sigana, I pointed out and we 
came to the harbour. We could not find the ship. I asked Supa where the 
ship was, and he said it was somewhere here. Then we heard a bang, saw the 
ship burning and the crew diving overboard. 
With that the Japanese turned for Tulagi. The attack on Mahaga had 
been called off shortly before they left Kolare, in response to a message that 
there was a ship waiting at Tulagi to take Bogese and Kuini Gee to Rabaul. 
The pair left in it on 18 May, arrived in Rabaul two days later, and for the 
next two months worked in the native hospital there. In that time Bogese had 
one brief discussion with Japanese doctors, about tropical diseases. 
Then on 1 August, after repeated requests, he and Kuini were returned to 
Tulagi. He was immediately given leave briefly to visit his family at Voloa on 
Nggela where they were staying. Although tempted to stay there with them he 
did not dare, he said, for fear "of Mr. Kennedy, from the Japanese having 
captured me at Savo and the burning of the ship Wai-ai. And the fear of the 
Japanese coming round and looking for me!" On 5 August, therefore, 
accompanied by his wife and children, he returned to Tulagi. He was there 
when the Americans invaded two days later. Although he told them what he 
knew about the Japanese forces on the island, he was shortly afterward sent 
to Australia for internment at the insistence of British officials. There he and 
his family remained, at Taturu in Victoria, until October 1945, when he was 
returned to the Solomons to face charges of having collaborated with the 
enemy. 14 
It was a sad prospect for a man who, in his educational attainments, in his 
high competence in the English language, and through widespread recog-
nition of his professional abilities, was one of the outstanding Solomon 
Islanders of his generation--and probably the best known. He was forty-one 
years old at the time. He had known and enjoyed success. But he had also felt 
the hurt of rejection, commonly experienced by educated Islanders in colonial 
society, and that well before the events in which, as he put it "1 lost my 
profession and my reputation ... and everything that was important to me."IS 
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Although concern for his personal survival prompted the actions for which 
Bogese was to be tried, his behavior between May and August 1942--and his 
sense of injustice at what it cost him--cannot properly be understood in 
isolation from his prewar history. 
George Bogese was born at Vulavu in Isabel in 1904, the son of Margaret 
Semo and Philip U'U, and was baptized into the Church of England by the 
missionary doctor Henry Welchman. He attended a village school until the 
age of ten, then went to the Melanesian Mission School at Norfolk Island 
from 1914 to 1917. After that he returned to Isabel where he became a 
teacher. In 1922 he joined the government service. He worked first as a clerk, 
one of the first 'solomon Islanders to do so, for five years. Then in 1928, on 
the recommendation of J. C. Barley, district officer at Giza, he became the 
first Soiomon Islander to be sent to study medicine at the Central Medical 
School in Fiji. 
He completed the course in 1930, winning the Barker Gold Medal for 
attainment, and returned to the Solomons in 1931 as a native medical 
practitioner.16 In this capacity--visiting villages, inspecting laborers on 
plantations, holding clinics at government stations--"Dr George," as he was 
called, traveled widely throughout the Solomons, becoming well known to 
brown and white residents alike. Well known, but not always well liked, and 
persistently suspected of misbehavior. 
Bogese's professional competence seems never to have been questioned. 
In 1934 his district officer said he was "keen and efficient, and takes a 
thorough interest in his work," an opinion endorsed by the senior medical 
officerP But objections against his character, especially rumors reported by 
missionaries of sexual misconduct with his female patients, flourished. They 
were not totally unfounded, although they were taken more seriously by the 
authorities than they would have been if he were a white man. Thus in 1934 
he was found guilty on a charge of adultery and fined £4. On more serious 
charges, however, he was acquitted. In 1936, on Malaita, a preliminary 
investigation cleared him of a charge of rape, but did commit him for trial on 
a charge of incest with his daughter by Anna Kovaga, the first of his three 
wives. On that charge, too, he was acquitted (but only after the girl had been 
medically examined), as he also was acquitted on a lesser charge of indecent 
assault against the same girl.l8 It was a decision that must surely have brought 
acute relief to a man who already had another daughter by his second wife, a 
Fijian named Anna Seini, and who was to have ten children by his third and 
current wife, Susanna Riko, daughter of Maaki Hathevu of Kolare.19 
Regardless of alleged sexual delinquencies, Bogese was guilty of another 
"failing" which was even more reprehensible in colonial society. He did not 
regard himself as being inferior to Europeans. One official wrote that "Owing 
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to his unfortunate manner he is not liked by the white residents of the 
District, with whom he is in frequent contact through their labour." Another 
identified the "fault" succinctly, "he is very self-confident.''20 Evidence of this, 
although as a trait rather than a fault, was given in 1939 when Bogese 
complained to his superiors about what he saw as "the unfair treatment 
accorded to us, whether native officers or ordinary natives, by some European 
Officers on many matters," and had the temerity to ask "is this treatment due 
to the rules [being] set aside for the natives ... or due to carelessness?''21 
Many other Solomon Islanders were, in fact, concerned about the matter yet 
few of the European residents would have disagreed with Kennedy's opinion 
about the kind of person who would openly ask such a question, or how he 
ought to be treated: 
Bogese is a person of a type well known to all who have had to deal with the 
educated native at loose, without adequate social control, in a primitive 
community. The type is characterised by limitless presumption combined 
with that kind of humility which has been aptly described as arrogant. In the 
course of some 24 years service in the Pacific Islands I have had more than a 
little experience of this sort of native. I strongly deprecate any suspicion of 
harshness or impatient treatment of unsophisticated natives in any 
environment, and have found that the less one raises one's voice the more 
co-operation one receives from them. But I have found, to the contrary, that 
abruptness and direct speech is the only method of achieving satisfactory 
official relations with those of the Bogese type.22 
Given the clarity of Kennedy's views and the vigor with which he 
customarily acted, it is hardly surprising that in late 1941, amid the stress of 
encroaching war, when Bogese and Kennedy were both appointed to Isabel, 
the two should fall out badly. Unfortunately for the historian, their mutual 
hostility means that neither is to be fully relied on as a witness concerning the 
other. The trouble began in January over food stocks, when, contrary to 
Kennedy's orders, Bogese gave rice from government stores to patients at the 
local hospital. He said he did so because they needed it; Kennedy maintained 
that the patients were young women who were not ill but whom Bogese was 
merely encouraging to stay at the hospital. Another dispute occurred later 
that month, after Bogese supervised the carrying of supplies from the 
government post at Tataba inland to Mahaga. Kennedy accused him of 
stealing some of the supplies; Bogese claimed that far from stealing, he had 
given some of his own food to the carriers, and that Kennedy had rebuked 
him for this, saying "You think you are a big chief, to share the food. You are 
only trying to show off." Whatever the truth of these matters, one thing at 
least is clear. Kennedy distrusted Bogese. Moreover, he cites alleged 
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difficulties in recruiting carriers for the shift from Tataba to Mahaga as 
leading him to suspect that Bogese was influencing the people of southern 
Isabel not to cooperate with the government. 
To test this theory Kennedy sent Bogese on a tour of the island in 
February to do medical work and to advise the people to avoid the Japanese 
when they came, and then sent a patrol after him to check on the instructions 
he was issuing. Predictably Bogese claims to have done as he was told, but 
Kennedy remained unconvinced of his loyalty. After three weeks he recalled 
Bogese from his tour and, without offering any explanation, took him to Savo. 
There he left him in the charge of the headman Johnson Soro, with orders 
not to leave the island and with the warning "be very careful, or you will be 
shot, or whipped, the same as the others." It was the last time the two met.23 
Kennedy went on to become a hero, while just over two months later Bogese 
was in Japanese hands. By September 1942, through another sudden change 
of fate, if not of fortune, he was interned in Australia with his wife and three 
children. 
It was not a fate he accepted easily. Over the next three years Bogese 
wrote a number of letters--consistently fluent, logically resourceful, and 
occasionally disingenuous--urging his innocence. He blamed Kennedy for his 
woes, stating that his appointment to Savo was due to "persecution and ill 
treatment" of him by Kennedy "for purely personal reasons," and arguing that 
had he not been sent there he would not have fallen in with the Japanese, and 
so could not have been forced to cooperate with them. He also compared his 
case with that of others and pleaded unfair treatment: there had been rumors 
about him, but there had also been rumors--and even complaints--about 
Kennedy in regard to brutality and improper dealings with women, and 
Kennedy had never been punished. Then there was the case of the Catholic 
missionaries of Visale: Father Scanlon had introduced himself to the 
Japanese, and Father Aloysius Brugmans had accompanied a Japanese patrol 
to Lungga for two days in July, yet they had not been treated as collaborators. 
And, he asked with plaintive rhetoric, though not unreasonably, how could 
he, "a poor defenseless native," be expected not to cooperate.24 As he put it 
to John Curtin, the Australian prime minister: 
It is well known all over the world how the Japanese committed atrocities in 
the Solomons, New Guinea, the Philippines, or Netherlands East Indies. 
Civilians were murdered in masses, captured soldier, both European or 
natives were ill treated, murdered or forced to do this and that, air pilots 
were executed as in the case of nine pilots at Rabaul. Filipino citizens were 
burned to death for disobeying them, etc. etc. How could I, being a 
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defenseless native, resist such a horde of Japanese who proclaimed martial 
law and death sentences in the Solomons?2S 
Unbeknown to Bogese, he was not alone in pleading his case. In October 
1945 the Anglican bishop, although admitting to a personal dislike of Bogese, 
wrote to the resident commissioner expounding excuses for his actions and 
asking that no charges be laid against him: 
Bogese is a Solomon Islander who perhaps prematurely was "educated 
above his station." ... But it is unreasonable to think that Bogese may well 
have thought that through a Japanese regime here, the Solomon Islander 
might get a better crack of the whip. After all there has been a British 
Administration in these islands for 50 years now ... are you proud, or even 
satisfied with what has been done for the peoples here by the British Raj? 
Your two predecessors have told me that the great contribution of the 
British ... has been ... "security of tenure" and ... the "Pax Britannica." 
Neither of these has been very apparent since December 1941. Is it treason 
for a native of these islands to think that the progress of his people is bound 
up with an Asiatic race rather than with the British regime of which after all, 
he is only a "protected" subject. 
I have no doubt that Bogese will plead that he acted "under constraint." 
If he so pleaded and I were an Assessor on the Bench ... he would get my 
vote for "acquittal." There were absolutely blood-curdling stories going the 
rounds in the Solomons in the first half of '42 as to what the Japanese had 
done on Bougainville to extract information. If Bogese had heard these 
stories ... I am not surprised ifhe gave such information as was aSked.26 
The administration, however, was unmoved. There was wide public 
interest in the affair, not least because of the crucial role played by the 
coastwatchers in the Solomons campaign and because of their dependence on 
the "cooperation of the natives" in operating behind enemy lines. Possibly to 
have threatened their security was, therefore, seen as a particularly serious 
matter, and one that required nothing less than a formal court hearingP 
Accordingly, after a preliminary enquiry, five charges were laid against 
Bogese; to wit, that he did "with intent to assist the enemy:" 
1 try to induce Rutu to lead the Japanese to the coastwatch base at Mahaga; 
2 induce Nicholas Gee to go with the Japanese to Rabaul; 
3 induce Rutu to tell him the whereabouts of the Wai-ai; 
4 assist the Japanese to locate the Wai-ai,~ and 




Unfortunately for Bogese the bishop was not on the bench when the case 
was heard. In May 1946 he appeared before the Chief Justice of Fiji, Sir 
Claude Seton, sitting in Honiara as a judicial commissioner, with two former 
planters as assessors, J. M. Clift and H. A Mar~am. On the first four 
charges, which related to specific acts and which called for factually precise 
evidence to prove that he had freely and materially assisted the Japanese, he 
was acquitted. But on the fifth, which was a more general charge and one 
where the prosecution was relying on its own perception and not on the 
testimony of indigenous witnesses who had been intimately involved in the 
events, it was a different matter. It was held against Bogese that "after he 
returned from Rabaul, he brought his wife and family in from a country place 
and they lived with him in Tulagi in apparently close association with the 
Japanese." On this charge he was found guilty and sentenced to four years 
imprisonment, of which he served three. Released from Rove Prison in 1949 
he returned to the obscurity of village life.29 Not for him would there be an 
obituary in the BSIP Newssheet. 
Bogese paid dearly for his association with the Japanese. He lost his job 
and spent seven years in custody. Moreover, the colonial administration, 
unforgiving and ever distrustful--as its records abundantly show--would never 
risk allowing him an opportunity to regain a position of any standing or 
influence in the Solomon Islands, or to live down the reputation of traitor 
that he had acquired, if not earned. He had not been represented by a lawyer 
at his trial, he was refused leave to appeal against his sentence, and from 
prison he was prevented from contributing to a political discussion then 
flourishing among his compatriots.30 In December 1946 he wrote an open 
letter to the people of southern Isabel, urging them to cooperate with the 
government if they wished to prosper and not to join the Maasina Rule 
nationalist movement. That in his exhortation he also touched on Solomon 
Islanders' entitlement to the "Freedoms" listed in the Atlantic Charter of 1940 
and to the conditions of life prescribed by the UN Charter was unlikely to 
make the letter any more acceptable in the eyes of authorities who were 
already prejudiced against its author, because such claims were also being 
made by Maasina Rule.31 If anything, the letter was likely to strengthen rather 
than dilute the distrust they had for him. Contemplating Bogese's eventual 
release from prison, one official even saw risks in encouraging him "to do a 
certain amount of anthropological work. ... Bogese as an Assistant Medical 
Practitioner was always apt to use his position to his own advantage, and 
might magnify his association with the University [of Sydney] to suit his own 
ends in some way."32 
In a similar vein, following his release, the high commissioner ordered 
that "[Bogese] should not be given any form of public employment,"33 while in 
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June 1951 the resident commissioner, after meeting Bogese briefly and for 
the first time during a visit to Isabel, denounced him as "one of the nastiest 
bits of native composition I have met."34 Presumably this was still his belief 
the following month when H. E. Maude, a former colonial official then living. 
in Sydney, informed him that two Australian professors, A P. Elkin of Sydney 
and S. F. Nadel of Canberra, were planning to bring Bogese ("who gave us so 
many headaches during the war") to Australia to assist them with their 
anthropological research.3s The resident commissioner declared himself to be 
"very apprehensive about the idea" and needed no persuading to accept a . 
recommendation that "Under no circumstances [should] Bogese be allowed to 
go to Australia for a year. He is a potential nuisance of the first order, and 
after a year in Australia he could wreck Ysabel in no time."36 Instead Bogese 
spent 1952 working in the less corrupting atmosphere of Lever's plantation at 
Yandina.37 He then returned to Isabel where, without profit to himself or 
danger to the government, he found some diversion in completing a Bugotu-
English dictionary.38 He died on Isabel. after a brief illness, on 18 June 1959, 
unlamented and unnoticed beyond his own district.39 
Both as the first Solomon Islands native medical practitioner, and as a 
reputed traitor, George Bogese has a firm claim to a place in Solomon Islands 
history. But he also has other grounds for that claim. He was the first 
Solomon Islander to have his writings published in a recognized academic 
journal. Already in 1940 he had published a brief article, "Notes on the Santa 
Cruz Group," in The Native Medical Practitioner, a journal published in Fiji, 
but during his internment he completed another and more ambitious project. 
This was an account of the traditional culture of Bugotu.40 In May 1945 
Bogese wrote to A P. Elkin, professor of anthropology at Sydney University 
and editor of the journal Oceania, introducing himself and describing the 
project. He had probably become aware of Elkin through the latter's 
involvement with the Society for the Protection of Native Races. In July he 
was to write to him again, enclosing a long affidavit about the events of 1942 
and requesting the society's help in obtaining "an official enquiry into the 
unfair treatment I received from Mr D. G. Kennedy, and my subsequent 
deportation and internment. "41 
Despite his reputation in official circles for self-seeking, there is, 
however, no reason to suspect Bogese of any duplicity in contacting Elkin. 
His first letter, and it was followed by seven others before his request for 
assistance, was one such as any editor of an anthropological journal would 




I am a native of the Solomon Islands and a Native Medical Practitioner by 
profession. I understand that you have some interest in natives' welfare and 
all that I wish to inform you [is] that at present I am writing, in very simple 
English, Anthropological work about my own District, BUGOTU, Santa 
Isabel, S.I. The subjects dealt with are: short history, clan totemism, 
sacrifices in altar, fables, tales, dances and songs, feasts and marriages, 
diseases and treatment of herbs and their methods, fishing house and canoe 
building, children's play and a tale of Mogo tribe (now extinct), Bugotu 
vocabulary in EngUsh, etc. If you think that this will be any use in your dept., 
please kindly inform me. After the war you may publish it if possible.42 
The work was eventually published in two parts in Oceania in 1948. With 
its appearance Bogese, the "educated native" rejected by the colonial regime 
for his lack of docility toward his "masters," and punished for being reluctant 
to risk his life for them, at last earned himself a measure of notability 
unsullied by scandal. At the same time he provided a legacy of knowledge for 
his people and set a precedent that other Solomon Islanders could honorably 
follow. And as time has passed and more information on the war has come to 
light even his unfortunate involvement with the Japanese can be seen in a 
more honorable light. At a conference in Honiara in 1987 numerous Solomon 
Islands war veterans publicly expressed misgivings at the readiness with which 
they had given their youthful loyalty to the Allies, and admitted to some 
bitterness at how little it had benefited them. Could he have been there 
Bogese would surely have smiled knowingly. He too had learned not to expect 
generosity from colonial rule, but well before they had. The most ironic and 
surprising revelation of the conference, however, came from Bill Bennett who 
admitted that while serving with Donald Kennedy he, like Bogese, had come 
to hate him. So much so that during a skirmish with the Japanese in 
September 1943 he had taken advantage of the confusion to try to kill 
Kennedy although only succeeded in wounding him. Yet Bennett finished the 
war a hero.43 
Such admissions indicate the complexity and subjectivity of the notion of 
loyalty, and of how it is to be assessed. Loyalty to whom? To what? Why? At 
. what cost? They also contribute to the rehabilitation of Bogese's reputation. 
He was no hero but he was more than "just a bloody traitor." Indeed, without 
stretching ingenuity too far it may be suggested that latter day Solomon 
Islanders might usefully find in Bogese a source of national pride. He was 
intelligent, self-assured, and pragmatic. And it was for displaying such 
qualities that he, more than other Solomon Islanders, attracted an 
opprobrium that reflected above all else the unwholesome fears, insecurities, 
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and pretensions inherent in the colonial regime--as in all colonial regimes--
from which the Solomon Islands became independent in 1978. 
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